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Introduction
Canada, as a small open economy, depends to a large extent on global economic developments. Trade and capital flow linkages to its major trading partners, as well as the foreign interest rate level, are important for the Canadian economy. In our sample period, about two-thirds of total portfolio investments in Canada are made by U.S. investors. The trade share with the United States is also quite large (77 percent in 1998, 68 percent in 2006) .
In 95 percent of all currency transactions involving Canadian dollars, these are converted into U.S. dollars and vice versa.
1 These figures indicate that economic developments in the United
States and its monetary policy should play a particularly important role in the development of the Canadian economy and its financial markets. There has even been discussion of creating a monetary union between Canada and the United States or unilaterally adopting a U.S. dollar peg. For instance, Buiter (1999) concludes that economic arguments favour a full, formally symmetric monetary union.
Therefore, when studying Canadian financial markets, one needs to consider economic events occurring in the United States. Gravelle and Moessner (2001) state that throughout the 1990s, Canadian market participants tended to put greater emphasis on U.S. macroeconomic data releases than on Canadian ones. Thus, one should expect U.S. macroeconomic news and monetary policy to have a significant impact on Canadian financial markets. In addition, it is important to study monetary policy communication in a broad sense, and not only target rate changes, as market participants also adjust to news conveyed in speeches and testimony by Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members. As U.S. financial markets react to informal channels of monetary policy (see, e.g., Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007; Hayo et al., 2008) , we expect Canadian markets will, too.
Our sample period, 1998 to 2006, includes several formal and informal changes in Canadian monetary policy. Ever since September 1998, the Bank of Canada (BOC) has intervened in the foreign exchange market only under "exceptional circumstances." In September 2000, it introduced fixed announcement dates (FAD); previously, target rate changes could effectively occur on any business day. 2 With the introduction of FADs, the BOC became more "independent" from the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed). The BOC does not explicitly refer to any prior decisions by the Fed in its post-meeting statements after May 1 Sources: IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey (2007) , and own calculations. 2 The Bank of Canada had four key objectives when it introduced the new system for announcing target rate decisions: reduced uncertainty in financial markets, more emphasis on medium-term monetary policy, increased transparency regarding the BOC's interest rate decisions, and greater focus on the Canadian rather than the U.S. economic environment .
For instance, between April 2002 and September 2004, the BOC target rate deviates
substantially from the Federal Funds target rate (see Figure 1 in the Appendix).
This is the first paper to study the effects of formal and informal communication by the BOC as well as by the Fed on Canadian financial markets using a novel set of data. In this paper, we address four research questions:
1. Does U.S. and Canadian central bank communication (including target rate changes) and macroeconomic news have an impact on Canadian financial market returns?
2. Which type of news, U.S. or Canadian, is relatively more relevant?
3. Does the introduction of the FAD system change agents' sensitivity to Canadian news? In particular, is there a stronger reaction to Canadian news in the April 2002 to September 2004 subsample, a period during which the course of BOC monetary policy was different from that of the Fed, compared to reactions in other periods? This is of particular interest as the BOC followed the U.S. interest rate path closely even after introduction of the FAD system.
Does U.S. and Canadian news exert an influence on financial market volatility?
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we summarise previous work in this area and outline the contributions of this paper. Section 3 describes the construction of the news dummies and explains our data set. Section 4 introduces the econometric methodology. Section 5 reports our empirical results for bond market returns;
Section 6 focuses on stock and foreign exchange market returns. Section 7 presents the impact on financial market volatility. Some robustness checks and alternative specifications are discussed in Section 8. Section 9 concludes.
Related literature and our contribution
Relevant studies in this strand of the literature typically assess the impact of U.S. 
Data
Our analysis takes advantage of a new data set introduced by Hayo et al. (2008) speeches. We categorise the data in an analogous way; we checked the coding at two different points in time to ensure stability in our interpretation of the contents. The number of events is similar to the U.S. data for statements and monetary policy reports and, in fact, these ways of communicating with the public are organised similarly in both countries (see Table A1 for a more detailed comparison between the BOC and the Fed). However, U.S. BOG members talk to the public much more frequently via speeches and testimonies than do their Canadian colleagues.
Estimated Taylor rules show that the Fed puts more weight on both inflation and output than does the BOC (see Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy (2008) results can be found elsewhere (Hayo et al., 2008) . More BOC announcements refer to the EO than to the MP stance. Positive economic outlooks and hawkish comments occur far more often than negative economic outlooks or indications of an expansionary monetary policy.
The finding on the EO can be related to the shape of the business cycle during our sample period, which includes only two quarters of negative GDP growth in Canada ( Also included in our data set are selected macroeconomic announcements from both countries. We choose, from the list in Ielpo and Guégan (2009) , the surprise components of 11 U.S. news items typically watched by financial market participants: advance GDP, industrial production, and trade balance to capture the business cycle phase; the ISM manufacturing index and the Conference Board consumer confidence rating for producer and consumer confidence; housing starts for real estate effects; nonfarm payroll and the unemployment rate to proxy labour market conditions; retail sales for actual consumption;
and the consumer price index and producer price index for inflation.
Twelve types of Canadian macroeconomic announcements are taken from the lists of Gravelle and Moessner (2001) and Doukas and Switzer (2004) : real GDP, capacity utilisation rate, current account, and merchandise trade balance to control for business cycle; the Ivey Purchasing Managers Index for producer confidence; housing starts for real estate markets; net change in employment and the unemployment rate to proxy labour market conditions;
retail sales for actual consumption; and the consumer price index, industrial product price index, and raw materials price index for inflation. These 23 (11 for the United States; 12 for Canada) indicators enter the equations as 46 dummies for positive and negative news, which allows for an asymmetric adjustment on financial markets depending on the sign of the shocks. (CAD/USD) spot rate, and the Canadian dollar/Euro (CAD/EUR) spot rate, respectively. 9 We choose daily data instead of intraday data for two reasons. At a conceptual level, we are interested in whether there are economically important effects that persist over time, instead of just short-term blips in the data. At a practical level, it is impossible to time the central bank news precisely in, say, 10-minute intervals.
7 Data source for surveys of macroeconomic announcements: Bloomberg newswire. The respective positive (negative) dummy variable takes the value 1 when the announcement is larger (smaller) than the survey. 8 Bloomberg surveys are used to identify surprises from scheduled meetings. 9 Data sources: bond and foreign exchange market series: Federal Reserves' Statistical Releases H15 and Bank of Canada's statistical database; stock market series: Datastream. Due to different holidays and different nontrading days for the various assets, some days are excluded. After adjusting the dataset, there are 2,170 observations. The returns are calculated after these adjustments.
Econometric methodology
Descriptive statistics show that all financial market series exhibit excess kurtosis (see Table   A2 in the Appendix) and diagnostic testing of preliminary OLS estimations reveals significant ARCH effects. 10 GARCH models increase estimation efficiency by modelling this volatility clustering and providing explicit estimates of the parameters describing the time-varying nature of the conditional variance (Engle, 1982) . We start with a generalised version of the GARCH specification as proposed by Bollerslev (1986) and apply a testing-down process to further increase estimation efficiency.
where α 0 , α 1 , β 1 , μ, , γ, δ, ζ, η, θ, and ι are parameters or vectors of parameters and ε t |Γ t-1 = t(v); with Γ t-1 capturing all information up to t-1, and t(v) a t-distribution with v degrees of freedom.
The general specification of Equation (1) is an autoregressive-distributed lag model with six lags. The vector of control variables consists of past returns of the dependent variable, returns on the other Canadian markets (e.g., stock and foreign exchange market returns when examining the bond market), and returns of U.S. bond and stock markets.
Contemporaneous returns on other markets and U.S. returns are excluded to avoid potential simultaneity problems. An impulse dummy is added on the first trading day after 11
September 2001. The variables of interest enter the equation when they actually hit the market, i.e., a speech after market closure hits the market on the subsequent day. Model (1) allows for student-t distributed errors (Bollerslev, 1987) ; these provide a better approximation of residuals that are not normally distributed.
After estimating these rich GARCH(1,1) models, we exclude all insignificant variables in a consistent general-to-specific approach (see Hendry, 1995) . The extensive lag structure of financial control variables is intended to capture the effects of omitted variables and potential inefficiencies in Canadian financial markets. As in the case of communication and 10 For both foreign exchange market series there is only mild evidence of excess kurtosis.
macroeconomic news variables, we increase estimation efficiency by applying rigorous exclusion tests to these controls. Diagnostic testing of the reduced models provides no evidence in favour of higher order GARCH(p,q) processes for all markets. Despite using student-t distributed errors, nonnormality appears to be present in all series and, consequently, we use robust standard errors as suggested by Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) .
Impact on bond market returns
In this section, we examine the impact of news on Canadian bond market returns. Table 2a (for Canadian news) and 2b (for U.S. news) show the reaction of three-month, six-month, one-year, and two-year maturities for the entire sample. The coefficients can be interpreted as follows. All target rate variables are coded as multiples of 25 bps. For example, the coefficient 0.089 implies an increase of 8.9 bps after a 25 bps surprise hike in the Canadian target rate. All macroeconomic variables enter the equation as news dummies (the actual announcement is higher than the survey). For example, a coefficient of -0.011 represents a decrease of 1.1 bps after negative (worse than expected) GDP news. In case of central bank communication, a coefficient of -0.036 denotes a decrease of 3.6 bps after a negative economic outlook in a statement. Shocks in either of the U.S. price indicators (CPI and PPI) do not explain Canadian bond returns. Thus, our results suggest that financial market participants believe that Canada is fully insulated from U.S. price shocks by the flexible exchange rate. This finding somewhat contradicts previous literature, which found CPI and PPI news to be significant. Unanticipated rate hikes and, even more strongly, unanticipated rate cuts 12 by the BOC have the largest economic impact across all maturities. U.S. MP easing surprises also have a negative influence up to a one-year maturity, but the size of this effect is significantly smaller than for surprising Canadian rate cuts.
13
The most relevant Canadian macro news is negative GDP shocks and both types of movements in net employment, which are significant across all maturities. Positive U.S.
consumption news (measured by actual retail sales and consumer confidence) and U.S. labour market conditions (measured by negative nonfarm payroll and positive unemployment rate shocks) also play an important role in explaining bond yields.
12 Chi²(1) = 1691** (3 month), Chi²(1) = 51.1** (6 month). 13 Chi²(1) = 1226** (3 month), Chi²(1) = 101** (6 month). Canadian negative EO news), but these differences are not statistically significant . We also detect that the impact of news generally tends to increase with maturity. The only exception is the reaction to unexpected Canadian rate cuts which is more indicative of a timing surprise than of a reversion in future monetary policy (cf. Kearns and Manners, 2006) . Statistical testing generally supports these conclusions.
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In terms of financial market impact, the coefficient estimates presented above could be slightly misleading, in as much as some types of news typically occur more often than others.
Therefore, we compare the impact of interest rate changes, macroeconomic news, and central bank communication by taking into account the frequency of news. Table 3 shows the 10 variables that exert the largest cumulative absolute effects on each maturity over the whole sample.
When taking into account the frequency of news, labour market announcements from both countries (Canadian employment change, U.S. nonfarm payroll, U.S. unemployment rate) turn out to be the most important drivers of Canadian bond returns. For example, negative U.S. nonfarm payroll news drives the two-year returns down by 2.93 percentage 14 Chi²(1) = 6.6**. 15 Canadian Testimony EO-: 6m vs. 2y: z = 2*. Canadian Rate Cut Surprise: 3m vs. 6m: z = -4.2**; 3m vs. 2y: z = -3.5**; 6m vs. 2y: z = -2.2*. Canadian GDP-: 3m vs. 1y: z = 2.5*; 3m vs. 2y: z = 2.9**; 6m vs. 2y: z = 2.2*. U.S. Target Rate Cut: 3m vs. 1y: z = 2.2*. U.S. Nonfarm Payroll-: 3m vs. 1y: z = 2.2*; 3m vs. 2y: z = 2.8**. U.S. Unemployment Rate+: 3m vs. 2y: -2.3*. U.S. Monetary Policy Report EO-: 3m vs. 6m: z = 2.3*; 3m vs. 1y: z = 2.5*.
points over the whole sample. This is a new finding as prior studies always highlight a broad set of important variables from several categories of macroeconomic news. We examine these subsamples for all markets using Equation (1) (without GARCH features) applying OLS, as we do not find significant ARCH effects in subsamples II-IV.
Again, we reduce the model size following the general-to-specific approach. For this purpose, we rely on the Autometrics algorithm described in . Table 5 contains a summary of the results for the four subsamples for the three-month and two-year maturities.
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To simplify the presentation, we counted the number of significant coefficients and allocated them to different categories of the variables: target rate changes, real macro news, housing and price news, MP communications, and EO communications. The frequency of unexpected signs is given in parentheses.
In the last two periods, we find more Canadian news with expected signs across all maturities. The impact of U.S. news is largest before and shortly after FADs were introduced, both in absolute terms and in relation to Canadian news. Thus, Canadian market participants 16 Results for six-month and one-year maturities are omitted to conserve space but are available on request.
did not put more weight on Canadian news immediately after the introduction of FADs.
Instead, Canadian news becomes more important (when looking at correct signs) in Period III, when the BOC target rate actually moved away from the Federal Funds target rate. In Period IV, during which the BOC became more closely aligned with the Fed's tightening cycle, the impact of Canadian news is still larger than the impact of U.S. news. news matters less. The same applies to housing and price news. In contrast, news on real U.S. macro indicators exerts roughly the same influence over the full sample period, reflective of the fact that the United States remains Canada's most important trading partner. This finding can be interpreted as supporting Gravelle and Moessner's (2001) argument that the lack of FADs is responsible for the relative unimportance of Canadian news. However, we find that the markets' focus toward Canadian news emerges only after a sustained period of deviation from the U.S. interest rate path. Therefore, it is unclear whether the reform of monetary announcements, the noteworthy deviation from U.S. interest rate paths, or a combination of both factors strengthens the importance of Canadian news.
Further evidence from foreign exchange and stock markets
We now assess the foreign exchange market in more detail using both the CAD/USD and the CAD/EUR exchange rates. Table 6a (for Canadian news) and 6b (for U.S. news) summarises the impact of news on these markets. We expect that good U.S. news will depreciate the CAD/USD exchange rate; however, due to tight trade relations and financial integration, good U.S. news is expected to appreciate the CAD/EUR spot rate. News originating from both countries has an impact on both markets. The reaction of the U.S. dollar exchange rate is dominated by a higher frequency of Canadian compared to U.S.
shocks.
An unexpected depreciation against the U.S. dollar after Canadian target rate hikes is offset by an appreciation after rate surprises, with the sum of the two opposite effects being statistically insignificant. 18 A similar situation occurs regarding U.S. target rate hikes and the U.S. dollar exchange rate: appreciation after a hike is offset by the surprise component and statistically insignificant. 19 Also unexpected is the appreciation against the euro after rate cuts.
Thus, target rate changes have neither a clear-cut impact on the CAD/USD nor on the CAD/EUR exchange rates.
In contrast, all macroeconomic news variables from both countries have the expected sign. Positive (negative) real Canadian macroeconomic variables appreciate (depreciate) both exchange rates. As to U.S. news, positive retail sales news has a depressing impact on the dollar exchange rate (positive U.S. news is automatically bad news for the exchange rate), whereas positive (negative) news appreciates (depreciates) the euro exchange rate via spillover effects.
BOC communication variables have puzzling coefficients for the CAD/USD spot rate, but the ones for the CAD/EUR spot rate conform to our expectations. A possible explanation 18 Chi²(1) = 2.3. 19 Chi²(1) = 0.01.
is that good (bad) news triggers higher (lowers) imports from the United States, thereby depreciating (appreciating) the exchange rate. U.S. communication shows the expected signs on the U.S. dollar exchange rate, while the euro rate is not much affected. Finally, robustness tests show that omitting the first nine months of 1998, which are characterised by interventions in the foreign exchange market, does not change the results. Table 7 presents evidence that news from both countries also matters for the Canadian stock market, as measured by the TSX index. Target rate changes have an impact only when they are issued by the Fed and surprise the markets with unexpectedly loose monetary policy.
Canadian macro news does not matter for the index, apart from a surprisingly positive reaction to bad GDP news. Five different categories of U.S. macro news are significant in explaining stock returns, for instance, a higher than expected consumer price index (indicating future rate hikes by the Fed) and a negative U.S. trade balance depress returns. 
Impact on market volatility
In this section, we study the impact of our news variables on financial market volatility. The specification of Equation (1) is too demanding for analysing the effects of news variables on the conditional variance. The large number of dummy variables in the models prevents convergence in the estimation procedures (see Doornik and Ooms, 2008) . Therefore, we simplify the specifications, as shown in Equation (2):
where the parameters are defined as above. Some of the control variables used in Equation (1) are omitted as we only include lags of the dependent variables. in six dummies. After estimating these models, we exclude all insignificant variables using a general-to-specific approach. In Tables 8a-8c we report on only those markets significantly affected by news in the conditional variance equation. Table 8a shows the impact of good and bad news in each country. Only the stock market is affected; positive news from Canada reduces uncertainty and thereby lowers price volatility. More significant coefficients are revealed when differentiating between target rate changes, macro news, and communication events for each country (see Table 8b ). On the one hand, market participants increase trading activity when the BOC or the Fed changes its target rate. On the other hand, Canadian communication and macro news lower price volatility.
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20 Chi²(1) = 69**, Chi²(1) = 46**. 21 Chi²(1) = 137**. 22 In the three-month regression, the absolute effects of rate changes dominate those of macro news (Chi²(1) = 14.1**). Statistical testing shows that the impact of BOC rate changes on the FX market is significantly smaller than it is across all bond maturities (CAD/EUR vs. 3m: z = 4.6**; vs. 6m: z = 2.4*; vs. 1y: z = 2.54*). Based on point estimates, we find that volatility increases with ascending maturity. This is consistent with Hayo et al. (2008) , who conclude that Fed communications have a calming effect on financial markets. Table 8c shows the influence of Canadian target rate surprises and nonsurprises on the volatility of financial markets. The results for the longer maturities suggest that unexpected changes lead to more volatility as the coefficients here are larger than the ones in Table 8b .
Further specifications and robustness checks
This section explores the robustness of our findings. First, we apply several different specifications to the macroeconomic news dummies. We test whether the actual values and the standardised shocks have an impact on our financial market indicators. Only the shocks turn out to be significant, thereby confirming the efficient market hypothesis. The same outcome occurs when including actual values and news dummies instead of shocks. Thus, it is only the news component of macroeconomic announcements that matters to market participants. We also discover that the results using news dummies statistically dominate the ones using standardised shocks and, therefore, we employ news dummies as in the analysis presented above. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) , which are based on Reuter newswire reports. These regressions reveal fewer significant coefficients and also contain unexpected signs. In addition, employing this set of data would shorten our sample period and we could not utilise the broader base of news used in our examination above. Therefore, we decided to remain with the approach presented above.
Fifth, we control for volatility spillovers from U.S. to Canadian financial markets. For this purpose, we rely on the conditional volatility estimates in Hayo et al. (2008) and include these in the volatility equations of models (1) and (2). As none of the Canadian markets is significantly affected by U.S. volatility, we retain our more parsimonious approach.
Sixth, we extend Equation (1) by some additional GARCH features. The variance enters the main equation (Engle et al., 1987) and asymmetric effects of nonmodelled shocks (Engle and Ng, 1993) as well as asymmetry thresholds (Glosten et al., 1993) procedure overburdens the models; we rarely achieve convergence and the results are inconclusive.
Conclusions
In this paper, we study the effects of all types of BOC and FOMC communication, as well as Canadian and U.S. macroeconomic news, on bond, stock, and foreign exchange market returns and volatility in Canada. Econometrically, we employ a rich GARCH specification of daily financial returns to capture the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity that characterises many financial series. We address the following four research questions.
First, does U.S. and Canadian central bank communication (including target rate changes) and macroeconomic news have an impact on Canadian financial market returns?
Central bank communication and macro news from both countries have an impact on all financial markets. This is a new finding, as ( We find evidence that the greatest impact of U.S. news occurs well after the FAD system was introduced. This suggests that the reform in monetary announcements had only a limited effect on financial markets' perceptions of Canadian monetary policy. Instead, Canadian news becomes more important during the period when the BOC target rate deviated from the Federal Funds target rate. However, in Period IV, during which the BOC became more closely aligned with the Fed's tightening cycle, the impact is still larger than in earlier periods. To some extent, this finding supports a claim by Gravelle and Moessner (2001) , who blame the lack of FADs for the relative unimportance of Canadian news. However, the enlarged focus toward Canadian news emerges only after a period of noteworthy deviations from U.S. interest rate paths. So, it is unclear whether the reform of monetary announcements, the strong deviation from U.S. interest rate paths, or a combination of both factors strengthens the importance of Canadian news.
Finally, does U.S. and Canadian news exert an influence on financial market
volatility? Canadian financial market volatility is positively affected by those Canadian target rate changes that hit the markets as a surprise. U.S. rate changes and Canadian nonsurprises also lead to increased price volatility, whereas all other types of Canadian variables lower price volatility. 
